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Citizenship and Social Justice in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia 
 
Eldar Sarajlić1 
 
Abstract 
The paper focuses on the ways that distribution of social resources is framed by 
particular citizenship policies and implicit views of justice in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia, the three successor states of the former socialist federation 
of Yugoslavia. It inquires about the nature of the relation between citizenship and 
social resource distributive policies, and assesses their justifiability and grounding in 
moral and political norms. By looking at the overlapping citizenship regimes that 
characterize relations among these successor states, it tries to determine the ways in 
which they do or do not conform to particular principles of social justice. 
 
Keywords: 
Citizenship, distribution, social justice, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The relationship between citizenship and (social) justice has been long recognized in 
the literature and given deserved analytical attention. It has been approached, 
however, from different directions. Political philosophy has looked at it while trying 
to tackle the philosophical and somewhat abstract question of the scope of justice – 
trying to determine to whom we owe justice and what are the foundations of just 
relations between individuals and groups in the world.2 Recent normative accounts 
have also analyzed rights and duties related to different dimensions of citizenship 
and suggested various theoretical proposals.3 Many empirical disciplines have tried 
to describe and discuss linkages between citizenship and other forms of social and 
political distribution in different parts of the world, making no normative 
suggestions, but trying to outline and understand the existing practices. While all of 
these are worthwhile efforts, what seems to be missing in the story about citizenship 
and social justice is an interdisciplinary account, one that will, while focusing on a 
particular set of empirical cases, combine insights from different disciplines and 
approach the relationship from multiple perspectives. One of the advantages of such 
an approach would be that it could not only describe and analyze one particular 
                                                 
1 Eldar Sarajlić is a PhD candidate at the Central European University in Budapest, and an Associate 
Researcher for the CITSEE project, School of Law, University of Edinburgh; email: sarajlic_eldar@ceu-
budapest.edu. 
2 Arash Abizadeh, ‘Cooperation, Pervasive Impact and Coercion: On the Scope (Not Site) of 
Distributive Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2007, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 319. 
3 For example, see Rainer Bauböck, ‘The Rights and Duties of External Citizenship’, 2009, Citizenship 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 475-499. 
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pattern of the relationship using comparative categories of contemporary political 
science, but also prescribe a normative solution based on a distinct understanding of 
what justice is, or should be. Such an approach could thus be both analytical and 
substantive, combining philosophical knowledge of justice and empirical insight into 
different forms of social and political organization in a novel way.  
This paper attempts to provide preliminary steps towards such an account. It 
aims to utilize a particular understanding of justice to say something more about the 
relation between citizenship and social distribution in one part of the contemporary 
world, the triangle between Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, three 
successor states of the former socialist federation of Yugoslavia. I will ask not only 
about the nature of existing relations and policies but also about their justifiability 
and grounding in particular moral and political norms. More precisely, I will focus 
on the ways distribution of social resources is framed by particular citizenship (and 
partly quasi-citizenship) policies and implicit views of justice in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia. By looking at the overlapping citizenship regimes that 
characterize relations among these successor states, I will try to determine the ways 
in which they do or do not conform to particular principles of social justice.  
This topic, framed in this political, social and cultural context, is both scholarly 
relevant and interesting for several reasons. First, from a theoretical point of view, 
focusing on the social aspects of citizenship is of crucial importance for 
understanding the substantive meaning and practical implications of citizenship as a 
concept. Echoing T.H. Marshall’s emphasis on social citizenship as a gauge of 
equality, this paper examines links between citizenship and distributive policies in 
order to better understand different forms of (in)equality in the post-Yugoslav space 
and propose a new perspective for normative assessment. 
Second, from a practical point of view, given their common social and 
economic heritage, the question of justice in social distribution resonates strongly in 
the context of the post-Yugoslav states. If they had shared a common contributive 
pool of both social and natural resources, what is, in terms of justice, left after the 
dissolution of the federal state? Has the process of state succession and re-
distribution of former federal property closed any further considerations of justice?  
Third, given the existing pattern of overlapping citizenship regimes, which 
feed different cross-border distributive practices, the question of the justifiability of 
such practices comes to the fore. If the forms of social justice and reciprocity are still 
firmly anchored within the structures of a territorially defined nation-state, while 
citizenship policies go beyond such strict frameworks, what can we make of such a 
discrepancy? What kind of understanding of justice lies in the background of such 
transnational practices?  
The ultimate claim I wish to defend throughout this paper is that the existing 
socio-distributive practices in the parts of the post-Yugoslav space on which this 
paper focuses violate the main principles of social justice: non-arbitrariness and 
reciprocity. But, before I extend and elaborate that claim, I will try to describe and 
analyze the existing practices of social distribution in relation to citizenship and the 
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implicit view of social justice that serves as their justificatory framework. Only after I 
describe the practices, will I try to prescribe a theory for their normative appraisal. By 
making such a clear-cut distinction between descriptive and prescriptive parts of the 
paper, I intend to enable a reading that does not necessarily need to adopt my 
subjective view of justice. Being fully aware that normative views of justice and its 
requirements are plentiful and often hard to reconcile, I wish to leave sufficient space 
for readers from other perspectives to grasp and appraise the multitude of linkages 
between citizenship and social distribution in the post-Yugoslav space.  
The argument of this paper will be divided into the following sections. First, I 
will make a short outline of a theory of (social) justice that informs my underlying 
assumptions about the justifiability of certain social and political practices. Second, I 
will outline the question of the scope of justice and bring it into a more direct relation 
with citizenship. Only after clearing the main conceptual ground, will I delve into the 
empirical world of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Serbia and try to map 
the relations between citizenship and distribution of different social resources. After 
mapping and examining different patterns and types of relationship, I will try to 
offer a normative appraisal of such practices and give a prescriptive value-based 
theory of their justifiability. 
 
 
2. Social Justice and Its Scope 
 
In terms of the normative framework this paper implies and puts into relation with 
the empirical indicators, two elements are important. First, the minimalist definition 
of justice as non-arbitrariness, and second, the relation of reciprocity as the key 
defining tool for establishing the scope of social justice – i.e. the range of individuals 
to be included in a social distribution based on the conception of justice. In this 
section, I will describe these two elements. 
 
2.1. Justice as Non-Arbitrariness  
 
Theorizing justice needs to take account of the sheer diversity of different theories 
and definitions of justice. As in most other fields of humanities and social science, 
there is no clear consensus among political theorists and philosophers on what justice 
is, or should be. The theories are very often radically opposed to one another, leaving 
those who ponder its definition and meaning to choose theories that seem plausible 
or desirable, while rejecting and excluding others. For example, one can hardly be a 
sympathizer of Ronald Dworkin’s egalitarianism as a basis of justice (which implies 
that all individuals need to be provided with appropriate amounts of resources so to 
be equal in the starting points of their lives4), and also think that Robert Nozick’s 
                                                 
4 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Equality of Resources’, in Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 65-120. 
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entitlement theory of justice5 (under which individuals are entitled to their property 
if they have gotten possession of it through an initial acquisition or exchange that 
violated nobody’s rights) is true and valid. Similarly, holding John Rawls’ theory of 
justice to be correct (which, among other things, states that inequalities are justified 
only if they benefit the poorest and least advantaged6) makes one reject most 
Lockean7 types of theories of justice that emphasize the primacy of private property 
and a free-market economy in defining what should be considered as just.  
Given such a diversity of theories of justice, it seems very difficult to come up 
with a minimalist working definition of justice. However, what seems common to all 
of these theories is the view that justice represents a system of relations and 
distributions that is meaningful beyond mere arbitrariness. Though differing in the 
ways non-arbitrariness is established as the benchmark of their theories of justice, 
authors as different as Rawls and Nozick would most certainly agree that rules of 
social justice must not be arbitrary, but instead follow particular laws established by 
principles of, say, desert or need. The extent to which the value of non-arbitrariness 
defines particular theories of justice will also differ, from minimalists, such as 
Nozick, to maximalists such as G.A. Cohen8, or luck egalitarians9 for whom justice is 
all about rendering arbitrary advantages based on sheer luck irrelevant for 
distributions of social benefits. But, one can say that what characterizes most 
contemporary theories of social justice is (at least) a minimalist view of justice as non-
arbitrariness, a system of values and arguments aimed at justifying a particular social 
distribution. 
In order to make a normative appraisal of the social distributions attached to 
particular citizenship policies in post-Yugoslav space, this paper will adopt the  
minimalist view of justice as non-arbitrariness as the basis of its normative critique. 
Hoping such a view will enable the broadest possible understanding of the problem 
with citizenship and social justice in this part of the world and generate agreement 
on potential solutions, I will leave substantial views of justice aside for now and 
focus on two things. First, I will discuss relations between justice (as any system of 
rules) and citizenship in theory, and second, I will map its practical manifestations in 
the contemporary post-Yugoslav space. Only after I finish with these two tasks, will I 
return to normative issues and outline how my minimalist definition of justice 
corresponds with the reality of post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 See Robert Nozick, ‘The Entitlement Theory’, in Anarchy, State, Utopia, Blackwell: Oxford, 1974. pp. 
150-178. 
6 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971. 
7 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Yale University Press: New Haven, 2003, pp. 100-211. 
8 See G.A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, in Ethics, July 1989, pp. 906-944. 
9 See Elisabeth Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’ in Ethics, No. 109, January 1999, pp. 287-337. 
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2.2. Citizenship and (Social) Justice: The Scope 
 
One of the important questions any theory of justice needs to provide an answer to is 
the question of scope. Basically, this question asks to whom we owe justice, or where 
are the boundaries of relations between people that demand considerations of justice, 
including requirements of distribution. Influenced largely by Rawls’ theory of justice 
and his views about this question in The Law of Peoples10, contemporary discussions of 
justice have predominantly sought to understand it within the categories and 
boundaries of the nation-state. For Rawls and Law-of-Peoples Rawlsians, justice is 
primarily a relation between individuals within particular (nation-)states, while 
global justice is a secondary relation that involves states as main agents, not 
individuals. In other words, the (distributive and other) obligations we have towards 
our co-citizens are larger and more meaningful than the ones we may have towards 
citizens of other states.  
A number of reasons have been offered in support of such a view. The 
fundamental one, argued by (Rawls and) Rawlsians, is related to the question of the 
site of justice – the domain at which requirements of justice are specified and put into 
practice. For them, the site which determines who is included in the set of duties, 
obligations and entitlements of justice is the so called “basic structure”, which 
implies an institutional system of rules, laws and practices that encircle a particular 
group of people into reciprocal, cooperative and coercive relations that have a 
profound effect on the character of their lives. By specifying that “basic structure” 
conditions relations of distributive justice, Rawls and his followers have drawn the 
conclusion that since there is no “basic structure” beyond the boundaries of nation-
states, there is no global (distributive) justice that would require transnational 
relations of duty and obligation between individuals from different states.11 
However, these views have been exposed to a philosophical critique that has 
cast a shadow on the exclusivity of nationalized justice, or on understanding 
distributive justice as primarily a relation between co-citizens in nation-states. A 
number of authors have suggested that even if we take the “basic structure” as the 
main site of justice, this still does not necessarily commit us to limit the scope of 
justice to nation-states, because a “basic structure” simply is a transnational 
phenomenon. Arash Abizadeh has recently mapped three distinct ways to 
understand what are the institutions comprising a society’s basic structure. 
According to him,  
 
the basic structure may be said to comprise (1) the institutions that determine 
and regulate the fundamental terms of social cooperation; (2) the institutions 
                                                 
10 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1999. 
11 For overview and discussion, see Jon Mandle, ‘Distributive Justice at Home and Abroad’, in Thomas 
Christiano and John Christman, Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, Blackwell: London, 2009, 
pp. 409-422. 
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that have profound and pervasive impact upon persons’ life chances; or (3) 
the institutions that subject persons to coercion.12 
 
On all three grounds, Abizadeh suggests, there exist sufficient reasons to take 
the scope of justice to be global, rather than national. Simply, the institutions that 
regulate cooperation between people, have a pervasive impact on the quality of their 
lives and subject them to coercion already exist at the global level, forcing us to 
recognize the need to theorize and practice distributive justice beyond the 
boundaries of the nation state. On this reading, the degree to which particular 
institutions do regulate cooperation between individuals living in different states, 
have a pervasive impact over them and exercise some form of coercion indicates the 
need to regulate distributions of resources between these individuals, regardless of 
their place of residence or citizenship status. National boundaries, in other words, do 
not necessarily limit considerations of justice, nor determine the scope of obligations 
we owe to each other, irrespective of our contingent location in the world. Instead, it 
is the relation of reciprocity that exists between particular individuals and groups of 
people that should determine who ought to be included in the schemes of social 
distribution. 
This criticism of nationalized justice notwithstanding, the majority of 
distributive practices in the contemporary world are still bound by the limits 
established for the world of nation-states. Though commerce and economic exchange 
have become global, the fruits of it in terms of social resources accumulated through 
institutional regulation have remained enclosed almost exclusively within the 
distributive practices of nation-states.  
However, the notion of the national boundary has not remained solely 
determined through geography. With the withering away of the importance of 
territory for the nationalizing projects of nation-states, citizenship became a new tool 
to conceptualize the boundary of national communities and justify states’ 
involvement beyond their internationally recognized geographical borders. As a new 
political tool of nationalizing states, citizenship policies and practices have also 
affected the ways distributive practices within these boundaries are shaped, 
practiced and justified. In the next section, I will focus on the three central post-
Yugoslav states in which citizenship regimes transcend state boundaries and thus 
trigger new considerations of social justice and distribution of social resources. Only 
after this system is described and analyzed, will I venture into its normative 
appraisal based on notions of non-arbitrariness and reciprocity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Arash Abizadeh, ‘Cooperation, Pervasive Impact and Coercion: On the Scope (Not Site) of 
Distributive Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2007, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 319. 
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3. Post-territorial Citizenship in Post-Yugoslav Space 
 
3.1. Overlapping Citizenship Regimes 
 
If one could talk about some sort of post-Yugoslav ‘constitutional space’, the 
phenomenon of overlapping citizenship regimes would most certainly be one of its 
defining features. Established as a tool for envisioning and conceptualizing national 
bodies of the nascent national states in the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s collapse, the 
system of overlapping citizenship regimes represents an institutional marker of 
national communities that goes beyond the given boundaries of former Yugoslav 
republics. It denotes the existence of two or more neighbouring national citizenship 
regimes on a particular territory, whose primary justification lies in the concept of 
ethnicity. Given that it appears in regions and states with ethnically mixed 
populations, prevalent especially among groups living adjacent to state boundaries, 
it represents a phenomenon of contested sovereignty and post-territorial politics. In 
light of recent research on the topic,13 one may even say that it represents a new form 
of nationalism - post-territorial nationalism - focused strategically at winning over a 
particular population rather than, after some previous attempts had failed, a 
particular territory.14 
Thus, the emergence of the overlapping citizenship regimes, not only in the 
post-Yugoslav space but also in Eastern Europe in general, is an indicator of a new 
form of nationalist politics, in which the strategic emphasis shifts from territory to 
population. Given that territorial claims on behalf of particular national communities 
against others have been delegitimized by the existing global order and geopolitical 
relations of power, it is no surprise that nationalizing projects of some nation-states 
in the region have sought to find another tool by which to acquire a broader regional 
clout.  
In the post-Yugoslav region, the practice is most prevalent in the triangle of 
states consisting of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Being the country 
with an ethnically mixed population, inhabited by Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs and 
other smaller groups, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most visible terrain on which 
the practice of overlapping citizenship regimes is exercised. Given such a 
constellation, most empirical references and examples will be drawn from the 
relationship between these states and their citizenship regimes. 
The genesis of the current overlapping practices derives from events and acts 
occurring in the 1990s. It all started soon after both Croatia and Bosnia won 
independence from the rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia. By introducing the 
                                                 
13 See Francesco Ragazzi and Kristina Balalovska, ‘Diaspora Politics and Post-Territorial Citizenship in 
Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia’, CITSEE Working Paper Series, 2011/18, University of Edinburgh, 
School of Law. 
14 However, this does not mean that claims over certain territories, inhabited by a particular 
population, are abandoned in principle. 
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new citizenship law in 199115, Croatia enabled acquisition of citizenship for ethnic 
Croats not residing in Croatia at the moment of the law’s enactment. Among the 
targets of such provisions were Croats in the near neighbourhood, primarily in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose numbers amounted to 760,000. Some estimates say 
that the majority of Bosnian Croats who had not permanently left the country during 
wartime, together with up to an additional 200,000 ethnic non-Croats who also 
applied, utilized the provisions of article 16 of the law and acquired Croatian 
citizenship. At the time of writing, more than 800,000 originally Bosnian citizens, out 
of an estimated 4.3 million in 1991, are holders of Croatian citizenship, which, 
provided that they reside in Bosnia and Herzegovina, makes almost a quarter of its 
population subject to the practice of overlapping citizenship regimes with the 
neighboring state of Croatia. 
The overlap with the Serbian citizenship regime is significantly less prevalent 
for the moment for a number of reasons. First, from a practical side, the possibility 
for acquisition of Serbian citizenship for Bosnian citizens was introduced only 
recently, in 2004, so there has been less time for the practice of dual citizenship to 
take hold among Bosnian citizens. Second, the nature of the involvement of Serbia in 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the political strategy of the Milosevic-era 
political elite prevented Serbia in making its claims over Bosnia explicit. This was 
evident in the discrepancy between its military and political involvement in 
protecting Serb interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which included not only 
significant military assistance but also political patronage in the international arena, 
and the citizenship legislation from 1996 that prevented Serb refugees from Bosnia 
from acquiring the citizenship of what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro). However, given the ousting of the Milosevic government from 
power and the institutional changes that would reform the country and bring it to 
final dissolution (the separation of Montenegro and Serbia in 2006), things began to 
change. The 2004 and 2007 amendments to the Serbian Law on Citizenship, through 
articles 18 to 23, made it possible for ethnic Serbs, irrespective of their residence, to 
acquire Serbian citizenship.16 Soon after Montenegro seceded, leaving Serbia on its 
own, a law specifying relations of Serbia to Serbs in Diaspora and the immediate 
neighbourhood was also passed17, providing more legislative grounds for Serbs in 
Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, and Hungary to acquire 
Serbian citizenship and maintain links with their ‘national homeland’.  
                                                 
15 See more details in Viktor Koska, ‘The Evolution of the Croatian Citizenship Regime: From 
Independence to EU Integration, CITSEE Working Paper, 2011/15, University of Edinburgh, School of 
Law.  
16 For more details, see  Nenad Rava, ‘Serbia: Elusive Citizenship in an Elusive Nation-State’, CITSEE 
Working Paper, 2010/08, University of Edinburgh, School of Law. Also, Jelena Vasiljevic, ‘Citizenship 
and Belonging in Serbia: In Crossfire of Changing Nationhood Narratives’, CITSEE Working Paper, 
2011/17, University of Edinburgh, School of Law. 
17 Ragazzi and Balalovska, p. 14. 
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There is some comparable overlap of citizenship regimes between other 
Yugoslav successor states, such as in the cases of Serbia and Kosovo, or Serbia and 
Montenegro. However, although we can see similar trends in relations between other 
countries, this paper focuses only on the Dayton triangle of countries because they 
share a distinct legal and institutional space (i.e. space of law18) that directly bears 
upon not only the institutional legacy of former Yugoslavia, with its mix of 
administrative (republican) divisions and symbolic (national) constituencies as 
fundamental building blocks of its constitutional order, but also an internationally 
recognized peace treaty, which links the countries in a formal and substantive way. 
 
3.2. Ethnic Justice 
 
The phenomenon of overlapping citizenship regimes in the post-Yugoslavia states 
may indicate the ways the main political actors in these states have conceptualized 
the question of the scope of justice. Although post-territorial and transcending 
geographic and administrative boundaries of the emergent nation-states, the scope of 
justice manifested by post-Yugoslav policies of overlapping citizenship regimes is 
predominantly narrow and exclusive, primarily because it is ethnic in nature: 
ethnicity is used as the main defining concept for drawing the boundary of the 
community of individuals to whom justice is owed, though other elements played a 
role as well, such as the legal continuity with previous political and administrative 
practices. This implies that, from such a perspective, territorial and reciprocal 
principles for defining the scope of persons included in relations of duty and 
obligation are of a lesser ideological (and consequently political) relevance. What 
ultimately matters in defining to whom we owe justice, according to this view, is the 
ethnic origin of the individuals or groups in question, not their formal citizenship 
status, place of residence, reciprocal relation, “stakeholdership” and circumstances of 
life,19 or any other principle that may have been used to define the scope of justice.  
From the perspective of analytic political philosophy, this is a novel 
phenomenon. It provides an answer to the scope question in a way that differs both 
from traditional, territorially-defined nation-state conceptions of justice but also from 
the alternative ones, which try to conceive of the scope of justice through some forms 
of transnational reciprocal relations, from cooperation, pervasive impact to coercion. 
According to ethnic visions of the scope of justice, none of these seem to matter, since 
ethnicity is a concept that does not necessarily involve cooperative forms of relation. 
The only relevant ground that renders the relationship between state institutions and 
individuals of relevant ethnic origin meaningful in a justificatory sense is cultural.  
Though transnational in the traditional sense, the concept of ethnic justice, as a 
background system of values and ideas of justice is not necessarily inclusive when it 
comes to issues of social distribution. On the contrary, it is only externally (though 
                                                 
18 Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship as a Space of Law’, manuscript, 2012.  
19 Bauböck, ‘The Rights and Duties of External Citizenship’, 2009. 
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selectively) inclusive but internally exclusive. While simultaneously including some 
non-resident co-ethnics in the distribution of political power and social services, it 
excludes (sometimes directly, but mostly through indirect discouragement practices) 
some resident non-ethnics from both, on the basis of their ‘alien’ identity. This 
practice has been prevalent in cases of overlapping citizenship regimes at particular 
points in all these countries’ histories, especially in the early and mid-1900s, when 
exclusive ethnic policies reached their peak. For example, in the early years of 
independence, Croatia systematically excluded resident Serbs from participating in 
the political and social life of the Croatian state. First, it had de facto disenfranchised 
the Serbs from Krajina, who fled Croatia after its military actions in 1995, by 
requiring them to produce legal documents confirming their Croatian citizenship 
(conferred on them automatically through legal continuity with Croatia’s republican 
status within Yugoslavia), which prevented them from utilizing particular social and 
civic rights.20 Second, through successive legislation in 1995 and 1999, Croatia 
practically diminished the political participation of Serbs in the representative 
institutions of the state, but also excluded around 200,000 of Croatian Serb refugees 
from the ballot.21 Though there has been some reversal of such exclusive policies 
since the end of the Tudjman rule in Croatia, minority representation is still only a 
minor portion of what it would have been had exclusionary practices not taken place. 
Although not externally inclusive towards co-ethnics in the region for strategic and 
political reasons, the Serbian political elite during the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
made significant efforts to exclude internal minorities from both social and political 
power and benefits. This was especially the case in Kosovo, where the majority 
Albanian population faced daily discrimination and was denied the rights and 
benefits their Serb co-citizens freely enjoyed.22 
Simultaneously with internal exclusion, broad arrays of practices “inviting”23 
co-ethnics from its diaspora and the region to participate in sharing political power 
and social resources have been put into place. Croatia led the way with legislative 
provisions enabling the participation of its diaspora in national elections, the result of 
which allowed for more parliamentary seats for Tudjman’s governing party. The law 
from 1995 “set up a fixed number of representatives for the parliament, elected on a 
separate electoral unit and on a separate electoral list. The electoral corpus of Croatia 
was increased by about 10% and the ‘Diaspora’ was thus awarded 12 seats in the 
Sabor.”24 Although the legislation was later changed (in 1999) so that representation 
reflected voter turnout rather than having a fixed number of Diaspora seats in the 
                                                 
20 Ragazzi and Balalovska, p. 9. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Gezim Krasniqi, ‘Citizenship as a Tool of State-building in Kosovo: Status, Rights and Identity in the 
New State’, CITSEE Working Paper, 2010/10, University of Edinburgh, School of Law, p. 8-9, Also, see 
Rava, 2010 and Jelena Vasiljevic, 2011. 
23 Igor Stiks, ‘From Disintegration to European Integration: Nationality & Citizenship in Former 
Yugoslavia’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 4., 2006, pp. 483-500. 
24 Ragazzi and Balalovska, p. 9. 
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/24 
 
11 
parliament, the practice of diaspora voting continued to have a significant effect on 
the election of representatives and national leaders in Croatia. Finally, due to the 
unpopularity of external voting in Croatia, the number was fixed at 3 representatives 
by constitutional changes in 2010.  
The distribution of political power across the territorial boundaries of the 
post-Yugoslav states is only one side of the practice of overlapping citizenship 
regimes. Though rarely treated as a topic of interest per se, practices of social 
distribution constitute a particularly interesting and relevant area. As in the case of 
political power, it follows the ethnic lines of justification and manifests along 
inclusion/exclusion parameters based on the concept of ethnic justice. However 
important, formal citizenship is only one side of the coin here. Distributive overlap is 
also very often framed through quasi-citizenship policies and practices. In some 
cases, the boundary between the two is blurred, mainly because the principle of 
ethnicity is the key denominator that determines the scope and nature of 
transnational distributive practices. In any case, charting the relevant policies and 
examples in the Dayton triangle is analytically important for understanding the 
myriad relations between countries in post-Yugoslav space that render this region an 
example of distributive interconnection and integration. The next section will outline 
some patterns of these practices. 
 
 
4. Citizenship and Overlapping Social Distribution 
 
4.1. Legal Frameworks 
 
In contemporary Serbia and Croatia, the scope of state obligations towards 
individuals it sees as its bodily constituents is determined through post-territorial 
understanding of the national community. Given the primarily ethnic and cultural 
definition of these respective nations as belonging to Serb and Croat people 
respectively, such a setup is hardly surprising. What is surprising, however, is the 
degree to which national states are perceived and conceptualized as guarantors of 
the symbolic and factual unity of a trans-territorially determined national 
community. This is decipherable from the existing legal frameworks that have been 
established to guide political and social practice. In this sense, Croatia has been more 
advanced, given its political priorities during the independence process and the role 
of the diaspora in it, but as of recently Serbia is catching up in establishing practices 
that link the national homeland with members of the nation abroad. 
Unlike Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have comparable 
legal frameworks to determine the scope of obligations toward its citizens in the 
neighborhood. There are several reasons for this. First, there are simply no 
comparable cases of residents of Croatia and Serbia who have acquired Bosnian 
citizenship solely on the basis of their ethnicity because no citizenship law in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina since 1992 has provided for such an opportunity. Unlike Croatia 
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and Serbia, BiH never had a state-driven policy to expand its pool of citizens into the 
surrounding region. The majority of Bosnian citizens living in Croatia and Serbia and 
possessing dual citizenship migrated to these countries during the 1990s, and most 
are of Croat or Serb origin respectively.  
Second, the (geo)political position of Bosnia is such as to prevent its significant 
involvement into the internal politics of neighbouring countries, even if her own 
citizens were concerned. Croatia and Serbia are signatories of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which gives them the power and justification to interfere in the internal 
developments of BiH to a certain degree. However, the Agreement has not granted 
BiH with reciprocal powers, so there is no international legal and political grounding 
for such practice. Second, BiH’s dependence on the consensus of internal (ethno-
)political powers prevents crystallization of any similar policy, because local Croat 
and Serb political stakeholders in most cases reject any attempted assertion of 
Bosnia’s political power towards neighbouring Croatia and Serbia, countries they 
consider their national homelands. Finally, BiH’s economic resources are comparably 
weaker than those of Serbia or Croatia, so any policy that aims to distribute social 
services and wealth beyond its administrative borders is considered irrational. 
Most of the reasons outlined above could also be used to explain the general 
inertia of Bosnia’s legal and political system towards the overlapping social 
distribution. Therefore, in this triangle of countries sharing peoples and (some) social 
resources, Bosnia and Herzegovina is largely a passive player, whose legal, political 
and social system does not actively participate in trans-border political and 
distributive practices. This is the sole reason why the section on legal frameworks of 
overlapping distributions discusses in detail only the cases of Croatia and Serbia. 
 
4.1.1. Croatia 
 
Although targeting Croats abroad and those in the region from the early nineties 
through favorable citizenship laws, only in May 2011 did the Croatian government 
issue an official document entitled “The Strategy for Relations between the Republic 
of Croatia and Croats Abroad”. This document specifies not only the duties and 
obligations of the state of Croatia to Croats living outside of the republic, but also the 
justification behind them. The basic premise behind this strategy is that  
 
all Croats, regardless of their residence and status, are members of one and 
indivisible Croatian nation.25 
 
The strategy has served as a baseline document for the establishment of 
institutional and legal tools aimed at defining and normatively framing Croatia’s 
support for members of the nation abroad. Soon after the strategy was adopted, 
                                                 
25 The document is available at: http://www.mvep.hr/custompages/static/hrv/files/110509-Strategija-
prema-Hrvatima-izvan-RH.pdf  
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legislators enacted the Law on Relations of the Republic of Croatia towards Croats 
Abroad.26 The Law precisely specifies who are its main ‘targets’: a) Croats in 
neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina; b) Croatian minorities in European states; and 
c) Croatian expatriates overseas. It however makes a further specification by stating 
that the Law applies to three different categories of Croats: a) individuals holding 
Croatian citizenship; b) individuals holding the status of “Croats without Croatian 
citizenship’; and c) Croats holding neither citizenship nor the status of “Croats 
without Croatian citizenship. Article 4 repeats the notion of an indivisible nation that 
all Croats outside Croatia are members of, while article 6 goes further by specifying 
that taking care of Croats abroad is a constitutive part of both Croatian domestic and 
foreign policy. 
The Law also establishes the state institution in charge of applying the law 
and providing support to Croats abroad in accordance with the Law’s provisions. 
Among other things, the duties of this institution are to support the economy and 
“sustainable survival” (art. 13) of Croat ethnic communities in neighboring countries 
of the former Yugoslavia, including Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are at the 
same time constitutionally defined as one of three “constitutive peoples” of that state 
and therefore strictly speaking cannot be seen, regardless of their number, either as a  
minority in Bosnia or as Croatia’s diaspora, as well as Croat minorities in Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo. However, given that the law was adopted by a 
conservative HDZ government, which was ousted from power at the 2011 
parliamentary elections in Croatia by the social democrats (SDP), the provisions of 
the law have not been implemented so far. 
 
4.1.3. Serbia 
 
Serbia’s relations towards “Serbs in the region” as they are officially called by 
Belgrade, including those in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republic of Srpska, are 
defined through an agreement between Serbia and the Republic of Srpska (RS), 
originally signed between FRY and RS in 2001, but renewed in 2006, after Serbia and 
Montenegro split. The agreement comes at the top of a provision of the Dayton 
Constitution (art. 2 and 3), under which Bosnian entities can establish special 
relations with (neighbouring) states and international organizations, pending 
permission of the state parliament. However, given the loose (and sometimes 
symbolic) function of the agreement on special relations, there arose a need to define 
the scope of Serbia’s obligation to Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina more specifically. 
Driven by this demand, as well as by interests in institutionalizing closer relations 
with Serbs in neighbouring countries, most notably Montenegro, the Serbian 
parliament adopted the Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region in October 200927, 
                                                 
26 The text of the law is available at: http://www.zakon.hr/z/507/Zakon-o-odnosima-Republike-
Hrvatske-s-Hrvatima-izvan-Republike-Hrvatske  
27 The text of the law is available at: http://www.mzd.gov.rs/download/dokumenti/ZAKON_ZOD.pdf  
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which similarly to the Croatian one, defines Serbia as the homeland of all Serbs, 
irrespective of their residence, but also specifies a set of state obligations and duties 
to its expatriate constituents. The Law recognizes two main categories of 
‘beneficiaries’: “Diaspora Serbs” and “Serbs in the region”. Article 2 of the Law 
defines Diaspora Serbs as: a) citizens of the Republic of Serbia who live abroad; and 
b) descendents of Serb expatriates; By “Serbs in the region”, it defines all Serbs who 
live in the regional countries of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Albania, and Hungary.  
One of the main functions of the Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the region is 
sustaining and strengthening the links between the Serbian diaspora, Serbs in the 
region and Serbia as their homeland state. According to the Law (art. 4), this should 
be achieved, among other things, through the establishment of a budgetary fund to 
support both diaspora Serbs and Serbs in the region. Article 5 is more specific in 
stating that funds for sustaining and strengthening links between the homeland of 
Serbia and is constituents should be secured through the state budget. This is to be 
achieved through public competition for funding of the projects of non-
governmental organizations aimed at the strategic goals the Law has defined. 
The legal frameworks in both cases provide legitimacy for different acts of the 
respective states related to provision of support to their diasporas and co-ethnics in 
the region. Some of these are specified through different provisions of the law, but 
many others are not. Given the broad definition of “sustaining and strengthening 
links” between homelands and their co-ethnics abroad, as well as securing 
“sustainable survival” of neighbouring co-ethnic communities, a whole range of 
practices may be included. Some of them may be tied to citizenship status, others 
may not, but the purpose and rationale of such practices is unequivocal: post-
territorial politics and transnational agency of nationalizing states. The following 
sections will try to map four domains in which these policies shape social 
distributive practices, thus inviting a normative assessment from the perspective of a 
minimalist theory of justice. 
 
4.2. Education 
 
The countries of the former Yugoslavia used to share a single pool of cultural and 
educational exchange. Irrespective of their republic of birth or residence, Yugoslav 
students could choose their place of study based on academic interests or 
institutional prestige. However, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the educational 
policies and access to educational institution changed significantly. In most cases, 
students from other former Yugoslav republics are treated as foreign students and 
therefore subject to high tuition fees. The exceptions to this rule are, however, 
particularly telling and indicate prevailing views on distributive justice.  
For example, provisions from the agreement on special relations between 
Serbia and the Republic of Srpska enable students from the Republic of Srpska, who 
possess entity citizenship to study at Serbian universities under the same conditions 
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as citizens of Serbia, while citizens of the other Bosnian entity, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) are denied such benefits and are treated as foreign 
students, regardless of their Bosnian citizenship, common to citizens of both entities. 
An exception is made, however, in cases when citizens from FBiH are of Serb ethnic 
origin. For them, the same rules as in cases of citizens from the Republic of Srpska 
are applied.28 This means that, in certain cases, formal citizenship (entity or state) can 
be legally disregarded in determining the scope of social distribution. Such cases 
indicate that citizenship is very often taken as merely an ideological and political 
instrument of ethnic favoritism that works well in some circumstances, instead of a 
prime legal basis for acquisition of a set of entitlements. The case of Serbia also shows 
the relation between formal citizenship and ethnizenship: where formal citizenship is 
absent (or until it gets operational)29 ethnizenship takes over the role of inclusion of 
co-ethnics in the schemes of distribution.  
Unlike Serbia, Croatian schemes of social distribution rely much more on formal ties 
of citizenship than informal ethnic memberships. This is reflected not only in 
distributive practices, which are more tied to formal than informal belonging, but in 
the nature of overlapping citizenship projects, which at times have granted 
citizenship to a large portion of ethnic non-Croats.  
Under the Croatian Law on Relations of the Republic of Croatia towards 
Croats abroad, holders of dual citizenship of Bosnia and Croatia are entitled to 
educational benefits on a par with resident Croatian citizens. No similar benefits are 
provided to other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of other countries in the 
region. They are treated as foreign students, with corresponding regulations 
applying in terms of studying, fees, quotas and other related issues. 
In addition to the provision of educational benefits in Croatia, the Croatian 
government has invested a significant amount of resources in the establishment and 
development of Croat educational institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially 
the Croat-dominated University of Mostar, in Herzegovina. Funds for support of 
Croat educational institutions in Bosnia are a regular provision in Croatia’s annual 
state budget. In 2011, the government of Croatia allocated more than 800,000 Euros to 
support such educational projects.30 The money went to 159 different educational 
institutions, mostly in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Croats form the 
majority, but also to some minority-status organizations and institutions, on the 
pretext of their Croat ethnicity or Croat citizenship. The type of beneficiaries ranged 
from university departments to primary schools and kindergartens.31  
                                                 
28 See ‘Odnosi izmedju Republike Srbije i Bosne i Hercegovine: definisanje nove politike’, Evropski 
pokret Srbija, Beograd, 2011, p. 9. Also, a news article at 
http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15637591,00.html.  
29 Judging by the Serbian case, ethnizenship is merely an incipient stage of inclusion that has a 
tendency to develop into full formal citizenship. 
30 The government act is available at: http://ba.mvp.hr/?mh=141&mv=4283.  
31 The entire list is available at: http://ba.mvp.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/111118-obrazovanje-
znanost.pdf.  
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4.3. Health 
 
In keeping with its approach to education, the government of Croatia allocates funds 
to support Croat health institutions and organizations in the region, where Bosnia 
and Herzegovina plays a particularly important role. In 2011, the amount was 
estimated to be as high as  200,000 Euros, and was donated mostly to local health 
centres and various non-governmental organizations focusing on health and social 
provisions, from demobilized members of the war-time Croat armed forces in Bosnia 
(HVO) and disabled soldiers’ centers to anti-alcoholism clinics.32  
In addition to assistance to Croat health facilities in Bosnia, Croatia provides 
many other health benefits to its non-resident citizens. Among these are benefits to 
young mothers, both employed and unemployed. Given that Croatian citizenship is 
one of the requirements for acquiring the right to such benefit, many Croat citizens 
permanently residing in Bosnia and Herzegovina attempt to make use of the benefit. 
However, other provisions require a three-year residence in Croatia prior to the 
baby’s birth, and registration at a local unemployment centre at least 12 months 
before delivery. Given the relatively high amount (compared to the standard of 
living in Bosnia and Herzegovina) of the allowance for unemployed young mothers 
(more than 200 Euros), it has been a frequent occurrence that young couples, holding 
dual citizenship and living in neighbouring areas of Bosnia, apply for residence in 
communities across the border and give birth to their babies in Croatia so they can 
utilize this benefit. Some data indicate that in only one of the bordering Cantons of 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first three months of 2012 there 
were 26 cases of local residents’ giving birth in Croatia and then returning to live in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, while keeping the social benefit.33 Of course, no systematic 
analysis of such practices is available, though some estimates say that there are more 
than one hundred such cases every year. 
Given the difficult economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the lack 
of social provisions for different categories of people, such practices are not 
surprising. However, the new Croatian Law on Residency might affect the scale of 
such practices, since it introduced more stringent measures to control and punish 
dual residencies, which are often used not only for acquiring health benefits, but also 
for electoral fraud, since it has enabled a number of individuals to vote two or more 
times at the national elections in Croatia.34 
 
 
                                                 
32 The entire list is available at: http://ba.mvp.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/111118-zdravstvo.pdf.  
33 The information is available at: http://www.livno-online.com/zupanija/11779-zbog-naknada-i-
drzavljanstava-bh-zene-radjaju-u-hrvatskoj.  
34 ‘Novi zakon za čišćenje biračkih popisa: kazne za fiktivne prijave prebivališta 3,000 Kuna’, Jutarnji 
list, 15.05.2011, also available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/kazne-za-fiktivne-prijave-prebivalista-3000-
kuna/946024/?keepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=600&width=800.  
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4.4. Culture  
 
The overlap of social services and financial allocations is most explicit and 
straightforward in the cultural domain. Though Serbia’s budgetary fund for support 
of cultural activities of Serbs in the region, envisaged by the Law on Diaspora and 
Serbs in the Region, is still under development, some minor funds are available for 
various cultural activities. These are allocated through Serbian embassies and other 
consular offices throughout the region. However, given the Law’s provision of a 
specific budgetary fund, more support to different cultural activities is to be expected 
in the coming years. 
Unlike the still ill-defined Serbian cultural assistance to Serbs in Bosnia, the 
portion of funds the Croatian government allocates to Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not only well specified, but also larger than the funds for health and 
education. In 2011, the fund amounted to more than one million Euros, and was 
given to different cultural institutions, from Franciscan museums and monasteries to 
various non-governmental cultural organizations and libraries. In 2011, 180 cultural 
institutions and organizations benefited from the allocated funds.35  
 
4.5. Military Retirement Funds  
 
A particularly interesting domain where social benefits between countries in post-
Yugoslavia go beyond state borders (and the usual means of justification) is the area 
of military pension funds. Under the pretext of fighting against a common enemy – 
the Yugoslav National Army and local Serb rebels – the Croatian state promised to 
support the fighters of the Bosnian Croat armed forces, the Croatian Defense Council 
(Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, HVO). The obligation acquired a form of a bilateral 
agreement between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina enacted in July 2006, which 
stipulated provision of pension funds for disabled members of the HVO who are 
holders of Croatian citizenship, and for the families of the fallen Croat soldiers.36 The 
latest statistics indicate that there are 6,803 individual recipients of these benefits. In 
2010, the average pension allowance for a member of the HVO amounted to 
approximately 315 Euros, the same as for a member of the regular Croatian Army.37  
The annual budgetary provisions for these practices are high, at least 
compared to other social benefits and provisions in Croatia. No detailed breakdown 
                                                 
35 The entire list is available at: http://ba.mvp.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/111118-kultura.pdf.  
36 See the Croatian State Pension Fund report for 2010 (Izviješće o poslovanju Zavoda za mirovinsko 
osiguranje Republike Hrvatske za 2010. godinu), page 11. Available online at: 
http://www.mirovinsko.hr/UserDocsImages/upravnovijece/sjednice/35_29062011/izvjesce_o_radu_i_p
oslovanju_Zavoda_2010.pdf 
37 See the Croatian State Pension Fund report for 2010 (Izvijesce o poslovanju Zavoda za mirovinsko 
osiguranje Republike Hrvatske za 2010. godinu), page 2. Available online at: 
http://www.mirovinsko.hr/UserDocsImages/upravnovijece/sjednice/35_29062011/izvjesce_o_radu_i_p
oslovanju_Zavoda_2010.pdf  
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and analysis, however, is available. But some data may serve as an indicator of the 
scale of such provisions. For example, in 2009, Croatia allocated around one million 
Euros to provide military pensions to HVO members in neighboring Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Critics argued that the cost of this social service was too high, since in 
the same year, the investment in building new facilities of the Croatian education 
system had been around eight times smaller.38 
 
4.6. The Rationale: Explanatory Frameworks 
 
The question of the rationale of such distributive overlap in the post-Yugoslav 
triangle of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, is an intriguing one. 
Especially in the context of the economic fragility of the former Yugoslav states, all of 
which had to go through a difficult transition from planned to market economy, 
encountering a number of economic and distributive problems, one might wonder 
what drives policies of such economically fledgling societies and highly indebted 
countries, to expand the scope of their national expenses beyond the boundaries 
guaranteed by the existing international order. 
The phenomenon may be explained through three different theoretical 
frameworks. Taken in isolation, each framework may not offer a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon, especially its normative dimension, but each may 
reveal some facts about the character of different national and state policies and 
indicate in what way normative considerations could be beneficial and successful. 
Taken together, they provide a more nuanced and informed picture about the 
reasons and rationale of social distribution policies in the post-Yugoslav space. 
The first framework uses Brubaker’s triadic configuration of national 
minorities, nationalizing states and external national homelands39 to provide a 
rationale to these practices. From such a perspective, the provision of social benefits 
and rights is just an extension of the already existing practice of extending the 
invitation to citizenship nationalizing states undertake to broaden their influence in 
the region and gain power through support to co-ethnics in the neighboring 
countries. This framework shows the different degrees to which Serbia and Croatia 
manifest traits of a ‘nationalizing’ state. As already indicated, given the different 
(geo)political positions and priorities of these states, Croatia has behaved more as a 
nationalizing state than Serbia when it comes to the scale of financial assistance for 
its co-ethnics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the extension of different social 
benefits. However, given certain legislative changes in Serbia, especially the 
amended Law on Citizenship and the enactment of the Law on Diaspora and Serbs in 
                                                 
38 See Jutarnji List, ‘Za mirovine HVO-a dajemo osam puta više nego za nove škole’, 02.09.2009, also 
available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/za-mirovine-hvo-a-vlada-daje-dvostruko-vise-nego-za-djecu-
invalide/308415/.   
39 Rogers Brubaker, ‘National minorities, nationalizing states and external national homelands in the 
new Europe’, in Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 55.  
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the Region, Serbia appears to be heading in a similar direction, indicating that 
ethnizenship in this case ultimately ends in formal citizenship. However, since the 
laws have been relatively recently adopted, it is still unclear to what extent Serbia’s 
nationalizing policies will develop. It may be indicative of its attempts that no data 
showing the numbers of Bosnian citizens of Serb origin (both from the Republic of 
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) who applied and acquired 
Serbian citizenship under the new law is available. For the Serbian diplomatic 
authorities, this remains strategic information they are unwilling to make public. 
The second framework takes notions of post-territorial politics as the key 
benchmark for assessing the different characters of the distributive policies in this 
region. This framework aims to explain the overlap of citizenship regimes and social 
distribution policies by pointing to population, instead of territory, as the new object 
of nationalizing politics.40 It is congruent with Brubaker’s triad, but adds a new layer 
of understanding to the relation between different political actors and the objects of 
their agency. This too shows some differences between Serbia and Croatia in terms of 
the rationale behind their social policies’ overlap in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While 
Croatian practices attach themselves to no particular institutional anchor in Bosnia, 
given the particular position of Croats within the Federation of BiH, Serbian ones go 
through the institutions of the Republic of Srpska in realizing their aims. To a large 
extent this is framed through the agreement between Serbia and Republic of Srpska 
on parallel and special relations. This, however, does not necessarily say much about 
the different character and rationale of Serbia and Croatia’s social policies, but may 
indicate future developments and the role of a particular territorially-determined 
object of these policies. As a territorially-defined expression of Serb national interests 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska is much more prone to remain a 
territorial object of political interest, and a nationalizing agency of Serbia than is the 
case with Croatia in relation to Bosnian Croats. In that sense, Croatia’s attempts to 
support its co-ethnics in the region is indicative of a much more post-territorial 
approach to strategic policy aims. The third framework builds upon Nancy Fraser’s 
analysis of the relations between redistribution and recognition in the modern age.41 
According to this framework, contemporary claims to social justice are distinctively 
divided between economically-centered redistribution and culturally-centered 
recognition. However, in the late 20th and early 21st century, claims to recognition 
started to predominate. 
 
The discourse on social justice, once centered on distribution, is now 
increasingly divided between claims for redistribution, on the one hand, and 
the claims for recognition, on the other. Increasingly, too, recognition claims 
tend to predominate. The demise of communism, the surge of free-market 
ideology, the rise of ‘identity politics’, in both its fundamentalist and 
                                                 
40 Ragazzi and Balalovska, 2011. 
41 Nancy Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and 
Participation’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford University, 1996. 
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progressive terms – all these developments have conspired to decenter, if not 
to extinguish, claims for egalitarian redistribution.42 
 
This framework might partially answer the puzzling question of why 
economically-challenged countries venture into social investments beyond the 
borders of their territories and initial constituencies. From this perspective, what 
drives such distributive acts is the implicit understanding that recognition, as the 
social and political emphasis on culture as the site of justice, should drive 
redistributive schemes. In this sense, cross-border redistribution is just an expression 
of recognition, or the need to have the identity of co-ethnics in the neighborhood 
recognized, supported and promoted. It thus reduces all questions of redistribution 
to its assumed cultural rationale, placing an emphasis on recognition as the ultimate 
political tool for generating preferred social justice arrangements. This may hinge on 
the recent surge in identity politics, as Fraser indicates, but it may also simply be 
attached to a particular understanding of the nation – not as a civic or political 
community, but a community of sentiment organized around particular features of 
culture and tradition. According to the visions of nationalizing states’ policy makers, 
the cultural dimension is more fundamental than the economic.  
Out of these three explanatory frameworks, only the latter one is normatively 
disposed, in terms of containing elements for the development of a framework for 
appraising the existing practices and suggesting proposals for new ones. The last 
part of this paper will be focused on developing and discussing such a framework. 
 
 
5. Social Justice for Post-Yugoslav states: Outline of a Normative Framework  
 
There are three aspects of the potential normative response to the practices described 
and analyzed in this paper. They refer to different dimensions of the phenomenon 
and offer a specific set of normative proposals for policy regulation. Additionally, in 
terms of critical assessment of the existing policies, they indicate elements of injustice 
in the existing patterns of social distribution. 
 
5.1. Recognition and Redistribution: Equality and Rationality 
 
The first one leans on Fraser’s normative outline that emphasizes the need for a 
balanced approach in which both socio-economic and cultural elements will be 
equally relevant and present. What is in that sense required is a “bivalent” 
conception of social justice, which  
 
encompasses both distribution and recognition without reducing either one of 
them to the other. Thus, it does not treat recognition as a good to be 
distributed, nor distribution as an expression of recognition. Rather, a 
                                                 
42 Fraser, 1996, p. 4. 
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bivalent conception treats distribution and recognition as distinct 
perspectives on, and dimensions of, justice, while at the same time 
encompassing both of them within a broader, overarching framework.43 
 
This proposal argues that the existing practices of social justice in the post-
Yugoslav space are skewed in support of recognition’s dominance over 
redistribution are normatively inappropriate as systems of social distribution. The 
reason why this is the case lies in the value and normative core of the bivalent 
conception of justice. The normative core of such a proposal is what Fraser terms the 
“parity of participation”, which  
 
requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to 
interact with one another as peers.44  
 
Clearly, the existing practices prevent all members of different societies in 
post-Yugoslav states from interacting with one another as peers because of the power 
imbalance that provides some with more political power and social benefits than 
others. What this means is that holders of dual citizenship (or co-ethnics endowed 
with quasi-citizenship rights and benefits) are comparatively better-off than their co-
citizens in both countries of their citizenship, due to multiple opportunities for 
utilization of political power (through the ballot) and different socio-economic 
benefits, from education to health and pension systems. For example, the overlap of 
military pension systems between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia results in 
double benefits for individual beneficiaries, former HVO combatants, who might use 
both Croatia’s funds for support to HVO and Bosnia’s internal military pension 
system simultaneously. This creates a social misbalance and inequality between 
members of different armed forces within one socio-political system in the country 
(the entity of FBiH), generated simply by the recipients’ ethnicity and the 
corresponding choice of armed force during the war. The parity of participation is 
also violated not just in one, but in multiple ways. Posited against the status and 
benefits of Croatian resident citizens, the individuals from the military pension 
example are unjustifiably favored by having two sources of social benefit for a single 
purpose while contributing reciprocally (in terms of taxes or other forms of 
reciprocity) to only one socio-economic system. 
Clearly, such an arrangement not only violates norms of parity in 
participation and equality, but also fails to correspond with basic forms of socio-
economic rationality. What this calls for is the establishment of a single, or at least 
more coordinated, system of information and allocation of social benefits that will 
take the norm of parity in participation and individual equality at the core of the 
system of social allocation. The violation of equality and parity is what makes such a 
system normatively inappropriate and subject to possible reform. But the economic 
                                                 
43 Fraser, 1996, p. 30. 
44 Ibid. 
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non-rationality of the existing practices as well as the widespread financial crisis in 
Croatia and Serbia – recognized through some efforts at curbing the dual residency 
and health benefits phenomenon – can also be among the reasons for change. 
 
5.2. Beyond Citizenship: Regional (Scope of) Social Justice? 
 
The second dimension of the normative framework that could be appropriate to 
amend existing non-egalitarian practices pertains to both theoretical and practical 
relations between citizenship and the scope of justice. Since the recent philosophical 
literature suggests that, given global forms of reciprocity, manifested through 
interconnectedness in terms of cooperative, coercive and effectual networks, there 
are reasons to consider the scope of global justice, similar arguments can be applied 
in the context of the post-Yugoslav space. If these reasons hold for this region, in 
which there might presumably be even more reciprocal relations of cooperation, 
coercion and mutual influence, there are sufficient arguments to appraise justice-
based distributive practices not only in the national, but also in a regional context. 
Taken as such, social distributive practices in the post-Yugoslav space are 
transnational in a territorial sense, but not necessarily inclusive and sensitive to 
forms of reciprocity between citizens of different countries of the region. Their 
transnationality is merely formal and inconsequential for theoretical argumentation 
of this kind because it is constrained by a post-territorial tool of nationalizing politics 
– i.e. citizenship. Had these practices been attached to any of the existing forms of 
reciprocity, they would have satisfied the norms and values of an inclusive global 
justice. But, given that they hinge on the citizenship status allocated to co-ethnics in 
another country, without any other determinate reciprocal requirement, they fail to 
correspond with one of the most important dimensions for defining the scope of 
justice. 
This would imply that the existing practices, in which forms of reciprocity – 
such as  taxes, social services, and citizens’ duties  – remain national (defined by 
citizenship plus residency), but redistribution goes beyond national borders on the 
basis of recognition of co-ethnics in the region, are incoherent and unjust. If the basis 
of social justice is dual, encompassing both the identity of the individuals included 
and the forms of reciprocity between all members of the community, then 
justification of social distribution practices based only on one of these dimensions is 
incomplete and generates injustice. 
In terms of a normative policy proposal, two potential avenues stand out. The 
first one is to retreat to the traditional understanding of the scope of justice and limit 
it to the domain of a territorially-defined national community. This would mean 
limiting the scope of social distribution to boundaries of the reciprocal community, 
rather than extending it to forms of political membership that do not necessarily 
require relations of reciprocity, such as citizenship of co-ethnics in a neighboring 
country. The second one is to push forward for cross-border redistributive practices 
that are not tied to citizenship and the co-ethnic status of populations in the region, 
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but to existing forms of reciprocity between people from different states, such as 
cooperation in production, the pervasive impact of particular institutions or coercion 
by the same regional or global institutions. Whichever avenue for policy solution is 
chosen, it will foster more egalitarian practices of social distribution in the region and 
curb the existing inequalities as well as discrimination on ethnic grounds. However, 
given the increasing interconnectedness and mutual dependence of the countries of 
the region, the second avenue seems more plausible, both in principle as well as in 
practice.  
 
5.3. Against Arbitrariness  
 
Since non-arbitrariness was outlined as the main element for describing a minimalist 
definition of justice, assessment of the current social distributive practices against 
this element is of crucial importance. In this regard, it seems obvious that the existing 
forms of distribution violate the minimal requirement of justice since the scope of 
justice is defined through arbitrary notions of ethnicity. As a non-chosen identity, 
ascribed to individuals on the basis of the accidence of their birth in a particular place 
and within a particular tradition and family, ethnicity is purely arbitrary, and 
according to most of the arguments for understanding justice, it cannot serve as a 
rationale for limiting the scope of social justice.  
The scope of distribution, in most cases, is formally determined through the 
extension of citizenship. But, in cases when citizenship is extended to individuals 
exclusively on the basis of their ethnicity, and not their “stakeholdership”, residence 
or circumstances of life, it is also arbitrary, and thus has the same moral value as 
ethnicity. This means that, in some cases, formal belonging of individuals to a certain 
state cannot be used as a sufficient justificatory mechanism to extend a set of social 
entitlements and benefits, because it is based on the arbitrary fact of their ethnicity.  
However, in the triangle of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia ethnicity has been 
taken as a primary element for provision and acquisition of citizenship and the 
corresponding social benefits. Given so, an alternative normative proposal would 
need to disentangle the arbitrary facts associated with ethnicity from patterns of 
social distribution. As with the question of scope, social redistributions are more 
appropriate and justifiable when connected to actual forms of reciprocity and 
egalitarianism than when associated with ethnicity as an arbitrary fact. This, 
however, does not mean that all forms of such arbitrary facts are irrelevant for 
justice. There are arbitrary facts that mandate inclusion into the scope of 
redistribution and even allocation of asymmetric benefits. These facts are usually the 
ones associated with some forms of disadvantage, such as bodily handicaps and 
some minority statuses. In these cases, the inequality of outcomes in terms of benefits 
is justifiable, and can in some cases include ethnicity as a fact – but only when this 
fact renders individuals and groups disadvantaged on some basis. If it is the case that 
some ethnic groups and individuals are disadvantaged and require acts of positive 
discrimination, this fact is then assessed comparatively against other similar groups 
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and individuals disadvantaged on other grounds than ethnicity. Only if shown that 
facts of ethnicity make individuals comparatively worse off, then ethnicity will 
deserve a special distributive treatment. Otherwise, tying distribution to arbitrary 
facts of ethnic identity generates social injustice. 
 
 
6. Conclusion: Citizenship and Forms of Social Injustice 
 
Clearly, the citizenship and quasi-citizenship status of certain groups in the triangle 
of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, has an impact on the nature and quality of practices of 
social redistribution. Because it has been provided and acquired on the basis of 
ethnicity, which is itself an arbitrary fact individuals cannot normally choose, 
allocating social benefits to individuals solely on this basis, seems to violate some of 
our basic intuitions and understandings about justice. These intuitions underline the 
two most important facts about justice, in its minimalist understanding – the non-
arbitrariness in terms of substance and reciprocity in terms of scope. Any social 
distribution that infringes these minimal requirements will be considered unjust. 
In more precise terms, the minimal requirements of justice indicate the two 
main forms and directions of injustice generated by the nexus between citizenship 
and social distribution in the post-Yugoslav space. The first form generates injustice 
in terms of reciprocity, and is directed from non-resident holders of dual citizenship 
to their resident co-citizens in the ‘homeland’ country who contribute to the total 
generation of wealth through different patterns of reciprocity, such as paying taxes, 
pension and health insurance and similar. Basically, while only one group of people 
pays taxes, another benefits without contribution. Provided that holders of dual 
citizenship are not a severely disadvantaged minority, in this form the resident co-
citizens are unjustifiably disadvantaged, because they contribute to the generation of 
wealth that is then redistributed beyond the initial pool of contributors. The ethnic 
identity of the individuals outside the contributing pool, apart from cases of severe 
disadvantage, cannot serve as a justification for the redistributive spill-over. It 
violates not only the non-arbitrariness requirement of justice, but is also socio-
economically non-rational. 
The second form generates injustice in terms of arbitrariness more specifically, 
and is directed from holders of dual citizenship to their co-citizens in their common, 
resident country. By the arbitrary fact of their ethnic identity, holders of dual 
citizenship are entitled to social benefits from two different countries, while 
contributing only to one. This leaves resident co-ethnics disadvantaged in a certain 
sense, since it tips the balance of social (and political) power in favor of individuals 
and groups possessing traits that should be normatively irrelevant for social justice.  
Any alternative policy regulating social justice in the ‘Dayton triangle’ space 
should either limit the scope of distribution to communities of reciprocity, or take the 
entire region, encompassing not only the countries selected as cases in this paper, but 
others as well, as a unified basis for creating adjusted and coordinated distributive 
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policies. Being more plausible and normatively desirable, the latter would mean that 
instead of “taking a single polity as our exclusive frame of reference, we need to 
focus on constellations of polities to which groups of individuals are linked through 
multiple and shifting ties”.45 In any case, a more just system of benefit distribution in 
this region should imply a tighter cooperation between state institutions of different 
countries, so the overlap of some forms of membership, such as citizenship, does not 
necessarily drive the overlap of benefits. This is a practical matter that hinges not 
only on scholarly research and policy development, but also on the political will of 
policy makers and leaders of the region.  
The aims of this paper have, however been more modest and focused 
primarily on pointing to the fact that the overlap of citizenship regimes in countries 
of the former Yugoslavia deserves not only empirical, but also normative attention. 
The paper aimed to show that one can analyze this phenomenon from the 
perspective of social justice and pose legitimate questions about the justifiability of 
certain practices associated with overlapping citizenship regimes. In that sense, this 
entire discussion has been more of a suggestive than conclusive nature. More 
research and argumentation needs to be made to enable many other dimensions of 
these practices to be brought to light and normatively assessed. My only hope is that 
this paper will open up a debate that will bring us closer to a more enlightened 
understanding of the multitude of meanings and dimensions of contemporary 
citizenship policies in the Balkans. 
                                                 
45 Bauböck, 2009, p. 492. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
